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Cohen: Intoxicating Liquor: Social Host Liability for Serving Alcohol to

INTOXICATING LIQUOR: SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY FOR
SERVING ALCOHOL TO MINORS
Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987)
Respondent served alcohol to a minor during a party at respondent's home., Subsequently, the intoxicated minor drove a motor vehicle and struck and injured petitioner.2 Petitioner sued respondent, 3
alleging that respondent's willful and unlawful service of alcohol to
the minor entitled petitioner to damages under Florida Statutes section
768.125. 4 The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss
petitioner's complaint, ruling that petitioner failed to state a cause of
action under section 768.125.5 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, 6 holding that common law did not recognize a cause of action
against respondent.7 The district court, however, certified to the
Florida Supreme Court the question of whether section 768.125 created
such a cause of action.8 The supreme court approved the district court's
decision, 9 and HELD, Florida Statutes section 768.125 does not create
a cause of action against a social host who provides alcoholic beverages
to a minor.10

At common law, a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated person could
not maintain a negligence action against the furnisher of alcoholic
beverages." Courts reasoned that the proximate cause of intoxication
1.
2.
3.
4.

Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So. 2d 246 (4th D.C.A. 1985), affd, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 246.
Id. Both the social hosts and the minor were joined as defendants.
FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1980) provides:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking
age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damages caused by or resulting
from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking
age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all
alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting
from the intoxication of such minor or person.

Id.
5. Bankstrn, 480 So. 2d at 246.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 248.
9. Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
10. Id. at 1387.
11. Barnes v. B.K. Credit Serv., 461 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985). But cf.
Gonzales v. United States, 589 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1979) (vendor not liable unless the patron
was obviously intoxicated at time of sale); Padulo v. Schneider, 346 Ill.
App. 454, 105 N.E.2d
115, 116 (1952) (provider of alcohol has no duty absent knowledge of danger to plaintiff).
963
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was not the furnishing of alcohol, but the voluntary consumption of
alcohol. 12 Additionally, courts were reluctant to extend a cause of
action to a third person, because the alcohol server had no duty to
the third person. 13 Many jurisdictions now recognize a third-party
action against one in the business of selling alcohol. 14 Most jurisdictions,
however, are still reluctant to impose liability on a social host, reasoning that one who serves alcohol incurs a duty to the public only by
virtue of earning a profit from such service.15
The Florida Supreme Court in Davis v. Shiappacossee6 first imposed civil liability on a vendor serving alcohol to a minor. In Davis,
a sixteen year old boy was killed in an accident while driving under
the influence of liquor that he had purchased at a drive-in liquor
store. 17 The trial court dismissed the father's tort action against the
liquor store owner,", and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.19 The supreme court quashed the district court decision,20 holding that selling alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years
of age violated Florida Statutes section 562.11,21 and constituted neg12. Barnes, 461 So. 2d at 219; see also Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197-98, 327 S.E.2d
716, 719 (1985). In Sutter, the Supreme Court of Georgia extended civil liability to social hosts,
but noted:
Under many circumstances the act which is the proximate cause of the damage
resulting from a breach of duty relating to alcohol is the act of the consumer of
the alcohol. Under such circumstances, the consumer is solely liable because the
act of furnishing the alcohol is too remote to be the proximate cause of the negligence
of the consumer.
Id.
13. Gonzales, 589 F.2d at 465.
14. See, e.g., Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (District
of Columbia recognizes civil liability of liquor vendors); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 111,
213 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1973) (Minnesota recognizes civil liability of liquor vendors).
15. See, e.g., Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. 1985) (Minnesota fails to
extend liability to social hosts). But cf. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224
(1984) (social host who supplies liquor owes a duty of care to the public).
16. 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963).
17. Id. at 366.
18. Id.
19. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 145 So. 2d 758 (2d D.C.A. 1962), quashed, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla.
1963). The appellate court held that the accident was not a probable consequence of the sale of
the liquor. Id. at 759.
20. Davis, 155 So. 2d at 365.
21. See FLA. STAT. § 562.11(1) (1985), which provides:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, or in the case of a corporation, the officers,
agents and employees thereof, to sell, give, serve or permit to be served alcoholic
beverages, including wines and beer, to persons under twenty-one years of age to
consume said beverage on the licensed premises.
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ligence per se.2 Because the minor was in his automobile when he
purchased the alcohol,2 3 the court reasoned that the vendor should
have foreseen the ensuing accident. Thus, the sale of alcohol was the
proximate cause of the boy's death.'
While Davis established that an intoxicated minor had a cause of
action against a vendor, Prevatt v. McClennan extended this cause
of action to third persons injured by an intoxicated minor.26 In Prevatt,
a youth who had been drinking alcohol in defendant's bar accidentally
shot plaintiff. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's ruling that violating section 562.112 constituted negligence per
se.2 Since injury to plaintiff was foreseeable, the proximate cause of
such injury was the sale, rather than the consumption, of alcohol.30
In 1980, the Florida legislature implicitly approved the Prevatt
court's extension of a cause of action to third persons by enacting
Florida Statutes section 768.125. 31 The statute imposes civil liability
on "a person" who willfully and unlawfully provides alcohol to a person
under the lawful drinking age, if injury results from the recipient's
intoxication.2 The Florida Supreme Court first interpreted this statute
in Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc.33
In Migliore, which took place prior to the enactment of section
768.125, defendant sold alcohol to a minor. The minor drove while
intoxicated, striking and injuring plaintiff.34 The trial court granted
summary judgment for defendant,35 and the Fourth District Court of

22. Davis, 155 So. 2d at 367.
23. Id. at 366.
24. Id. at 367. The court reasoned that the obvious immaturity of the purchasers and the
fact that they were seated in their car rendered the ensuing accident foreseeable. The court
analogized to Tamami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959), in which the supreme
court held a dealer of firearms liable for injuries sustained by a minor to whom the dealer had
sold a rifle in violation of a city ordinance. Id.
25. 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1967).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 780-81.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 562.11(1) (1985).
29. Prevatt, 201 So. 2d at 781.
30. Id. The court noted that the intoxicated youth and another minor had been quarreling
noisily prior to the shooting, and that it should have been foreseeable to anyone present that
the youths would cause trouble. Id.
31. Act of May 23, 1980, ch. 80-37, 1980 Fla. Laws 130 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
768.125 (1985)).
32. Id.
33. 448 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1984).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Appeal affirmed. 36 The district court concluded that the legislature did
37
not intend section 562.11 to extend a cause of action to third persons.
The Florida Supreme Court, however, adopted the Prevatt court's
view that a third person could maintain a cause of action against one
serving alcohol to a minor. 38 The court reasoned that since Prevatt
extended vendor liability under section 562.11 to injured third persons,

the legislature realized this and enacted section 768.125 to limit such
liability.

9

.

In the instant case, the court interpreted section 768.125 as it had
in Migliore.40 The court asserted that since Prevatt recognized that
vendor liability extended to third persons, the legislature intended to

limit such broadened liability to instances of willful and unlawful conduct.41 Because a limiting statute would not simultaneously create a
new cause of action, 42 the court concluded that the statute did not
create social host liability. 3
The instant court relied on Migliore's interpretation of legislative
intent.44 In Migliore, the court referred to the enacting title of section
768.125, 45 which provides that the statute relates to Florida Statutes
chapter 562, entitled "Beverage Law: Enforcement. '46 Since chapter
562 sets out the requirements imposed on liquor licensees, 47 the Migliore court concluded that the legislature intended the new statute to

36. Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 425 So. 2d 20 (4th D.C.A. 1982), quashed,
448 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1984).
37. Id. at 22. The appellate court held that § 562.11 does not extend vendor liability to
injured third persons because the statute was enacted for the sole purpose of protecting minors.
Id. The court reasoned that the subsequent enactment of § 768.125 indicates the legislature's
intent to create such liability. Migliore, 425 So. 2d at 23.
38. Migliore, 448 So. 2d at 981.
39. Id. The court held that Prevatt had broadened the liability of vendors at common law,
and that the purpose of § 768.125 was to limit such liability based in negligence by adding the
requirement of willfulness. Id.
40. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1386; see also Armstrong v. Mumford, 451 So. 2d 480, 481
(Fla. 1984) (holding that § 768.125 limits vendor liability).
41. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1387.
42. Id. The court referred to the holding in Davis, 155 So. 2d at 365, that a cause of action
against a social host was not recognized at common law.
43. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1385.
44. Id. at 1386-87.
45. Migliore, 448 So. 2d at 981.
46. See Act of May 23, 1980, ch. 80-37, 1980 Fla. Laws 130. The Joint Legislative Management Committee placed the statute in "Chapter 768: Negligence." Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1386.
The court rejected the dissent's emphasis on the statute's placement in the negligence chapter,
refusing to allow the Committee's action to alter the substance of the statute. Id.
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 562.01-.51 (1985).
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apply only to such licensees.4 The court held that by requiring willful
and unlawful conduct, the statute limits the liability Prevatt imposed
on vendors. 49 The instant court acknowledged "superficial appeal" in
petitioner's claim that the plain language of section 768.125 applies to
social hosts. 0 In the interest of consistency in statutory interpretation,
however, it did not reexamine the validity of the Migliore analysis;
the court refused to "simply ignore" such prior decisions.51 The court
also declined to recognize a common law cause of action in favor of
plaintiff, choosing instead to defer such public policy questions to the
2
legislature.3
In the lone dissenting opinion, Justice Adkins asserted that the
majority erred in attempting to divine the legislature's hidden intent
when the statute was plain and unambiguous on its face.0 Justice
Adkins noted that the plain meaning of section 768.125 clearly imposes
liability upon social hosts. 4 He distinguished Migliore as an assessment
only of vendor liability,6 5 and asserted that the placement of the statute
in the negligence chapter removes the statute from the realm of vendor
liability.6 6
Justice Adkins also argued that the "obvious, foreseeable risk" of
providing alcohol to minors is present regardless of whether or not
the alcohol provider is licensed.5 7 Furthermore, all of the negligence
principles apply equally to vendors and social hosts. 4 Thus, Justice
Adkins concluded that a social host who willfully provides alcohol to
59
a minor should be liable for negligence per se.

48. Migliore, 448 So. 2d at 981.
49. Id.
50. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1387.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1388 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 425 So. 2d
534 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979)).
54. Id. The statute holds liable "a person" who willfully and unlawfully provides alcohol to
a minor. FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1985). Although § 562.11 makes it unlawful only for vendors
to provide alcoholic beverages to persons under 21, Justice Adkins maintained that a social
host's service of alcohol to a minor is unlawful either as aiding and abetting a minor in unlawfully
possessing alcohol under that section, see FLA. STAT. § 562.111 (1985), or as contributing to
the delinquency of a minor under a child abuse statute, see FLA. STAT. § 827.04(3) (1985).
Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1389 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
55. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1389 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1388.
57. Id. at 1390 (citing Aligliore, 448 So. 2d at 980).
58. Id.
59. Id. Violation of the statute is per se unreasonable. If the victim is one whom the statute
was intended to protect, if the violation is of the type the statute is meant to protect against,
and if the resulting injury is foreseeable, the defendant should be held liable.
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As Justice Adkins noted, the plain meaning of section 768.125
clearly imposes liability on a social host. The reference to "a person"

is not qualified elsewhere in the text of the statute.r The host's service
of alcohol meets the statute's requirement of unlawfulness, because2

such conduct both aids and abets 61 a minor's possession of alcoholC
and contributes to the delinquency of a minor.63 The instant court,

however, looked beyond the face of the statute in its effort to discern

legislative intent. Although the court's role in statutory interpretation
is to effectuate the legislature's intent,63 the court is bound by the
statute's plain and unambiguous language.6
The court implied that the legislature's intended placement of the
statute in the Beverage Law chapter creates enough ambiguity to
require the court to look beyond the statute's plain meaning to determine legislative intent.6 When the legislature, instead of non-legislative bodies, inserts such headings, the headings may be considered
part of the statute. 67 The legislature's characterization of the statute

60. FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1985) holds liable "a person" who willfully and unlawfully provides
alcohol to a minor.
61. A party aids and abets a crime by intentionally assisting or encouraging the commission
thereof. G.C. v. State, 407 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). An aider-abettor is liable as
a principal offender. Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 1982).
62. FLA. STAT. § 562.111 (1985) provides: "It is unlawful for any person under the age of
twenty-one years, except a person employed under the provisions of s. 562.13 acting in the
scope of his employment, to have in his possession alcoholic beverages .... " Id.
63. A juvenile in possession of alcohol may be adjudicated delinquent. D.C.E. v. State, 381
So. 2d 1097, 1098 (1st D.C.A. 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1980). FLA. STAT. §
827.04(3) (1985) provides:
Any person who commits any act which thereby causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18 years to become a delinquent or dependent
child, as defined under the laws of Florida, or which contributes thereto, or any
person who shall, by act, threats, commands, or persuasion, induce or endeavor
to induce any person under the age of 18 years to do or to perform any act, to
follow any course of conduct, or so to live, as would cause or tend to cause such
person under the age of 18 years to become or to remain a dependent or delinquent
child, as defined under the laws of this state, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree ....
Id.

64. See, e.g., Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1978) (it is not the
function of courts to speculate when statutory language is unambiguous); Tropical Coach Line,
Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779, 782 (Fla. 1960) (courts are not authorized to speculate as to
intent when statute is clear).
65. See, e.g., Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 425 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller,
370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979).
66. See Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1387.
67. Askew v. MGIC Dev. Corp., 262 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1972) (statutory
headings inserted by nonlegislators as a convenient index are not part of the statute).
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as "relating to the Beverage Law' ' s implicitly ratifies the title and
effectively incorporates the title in the statute. Furthermore, the court
is justified in looking beyond the face of the statute when another
section of the act indicates an alternative interpretation. 69 Because the
legislature intended the Beverage Law chapter to include the statute,
the court properly considered the exclusive application of section
562.11 to vendors in interpreting section 768.125.

Although the court properly considered the legislature's intent to
place the statute in chapter 562,70 the court's conclusion that the legis-

lature intended the act to apply only to vendors 71 is suspect. The
words "Beverage Law" imply no limitation to licensed alcohol vendors.
While the chapter consists primarily of regulations applying exclusively

to such vendors, it also contains numerous statutes that apply to
non-vendors.T2 Thus, no inherent inconsistency exists in placing a statute regulating both vendors and social hosts in the Beverage Law

chapter.
In interpreting the statute, the court relied heavily on the premise

that the legislature would not limit vendor liability and simultaneously
create a previously unrecognized cause of action against social hosts. 3
Although the legislature enacted the statute after the Prevatt court
held a vendor liable to injured third parties, the legislature's intent
may have been to codify, rather than limit, such liability. Even if the
legislature imposed the willfulness requirement to limit vendor liability
under negligence principles, 74 the legislature could have intended

simultaneously to limit social host liability, even assuming that such
liability was unrecognized at common law. 75 Had the legislature in68. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1386.
69. See United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F. Supp. 339, 340
(M.D. Fla. 1986) (party challenging a statute's plain meaning must show that the plain meaning
is inconsistent with another section, the purpose of the act, other acts, or legislative history).
70. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at 1387.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 562.111 (1985) (prohibiting persons under 21 from possessing
alcohol); FLA. STAT. § 562.15 (Supp. 1986) (making it unlawful for any person to possess more
than one gallon of alcoholic beverage without payment of proper excise taxes); FLA. STAT. §
562.451 (1985) (prohibiting possession of illegally manufactured liquor).
73. Bankston, 507 So. 2d at. 1387.
74. See generally Davis, 155 So. 2d at 365 (discussion of requirements for negligence per se).
75. Prior to the enactment of § 768.125, Florida courts had never found a social host liable
for injuries to a third person caused by an intoxicated minor. A social host, however, has a
duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691,
695 (Fla. 1973). This same standard applies to tavern owners. See, e.g., Cohen v. Schott, 48
So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1950) (a liquor licensee must exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain
that patrons are of lawful drinldng age). Therefore, common law acknowledges no clear logical
distinction between the duties and liabilities of social hosts and liquor vendors.
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tended that the statute apply exclusively to vendors, it could easily
have expressed such a limitation. Instead, the legislature employed
the broadest terms possible.
Although the court may look beyond the face of the statute to
resolve perceived ambiguities, it may not ignore the statute's plain
language. The court must regard the terms chosen by the legislature
as the primary indication of legislative intent. The intended placement
of section 768.125 in the Beverage Law chapter, and the legislature's
apparent intention to limit vendor liability, would be of questionable
interpretive Value if applied to an ambiguous or facially neutral statute;
these factors are certainly insufficient to overcome the clear indication
on the face of the statute that it was intended to apply to social hosts.
The supreme court should have complied with legislative intent and
applied section 768.125 to social hosts. Thereafter, the legislature could
correct its drafting error if the statute's plain meaning did not convey
actual legislative intent.
David Cohen
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